An interdisciplinary approach: schizophrenia derails heteronormative expectations in psychological narratives by Weaver, Bobbie Jo
SUNY College Cortland 
Digital Commons @ Cortland 
Master's Theses 
4-2021 
An interdisciplinary approach: schizophrenia derails 
heteronormative expectations in psychological narratives 
Bobbie Jo Weaver 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.cortland.edu/theses 
 Part of the Cognitive Psychology Commons, English Language and Literature Commons, Nonfiction 
Commons, Psychiatric and Mental Health Commons, and the Psychiatry and Psychology Commons 
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk











An Interdisciplinary Approach: 












Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements 





Department of English, School of Arts and Sciences 
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 

















Student Signature: ______________________________________________________________ 
 
Thesis Title: An Interdisciplinary Approach: Schizophrenia Derails Heteronormative__________ 




Thesis Advisor Signature: ________________________________________________________ 
 
 








Required introductory psychology courses teach students a general and oversimplified 
version of the immense number of subfields within Psychology studies, much like introductory 
literature classes compress different genera throughout history into a miniscule number of 
“representative” texts. Nevertheless, these footholds generate an entryway into a whole new 
world of (specialized) exploration. Reading a text such as The Quiet Room: A Journey out of the 
Torment of Madness by Lori Schiller and Amanda Bennett provides a window for many students 
to crawl into one of Psychology’s darkest shadows, the field of abnormal psychology. Schiller’s 
non-fictional memoir, The Quiet Room, tells readers about the experiences of living with 
schizophrenia. Since psychology maintains a focus on the narrative of the mind, it has an innate 
interest in non-fictional literature. However, fictional literature offers both Psychology and 
Literary Studies a window into unique forms and styles of psychological narratives, such as 
found in the novel The Drowning Girl: A Memoir by Caitlin Kiernan.  
The Quiet Room has a laser focuses on schizophrenia and presents an accurate account of 
the inner world of a mind plagued with the diverse and intrusive symptoms of the illness. 
Schiller’s memoir is a non-fictional recollection of Shiller’s own personal experiences with 
schizophrenia and offers an insider’s view into the illness. Schiller recounts her ten-year fight 
with her mental illness from the first onset to several suicide attempts, including living life after 
diagnosis, moving in and out of mental hospitals, struggling to find the right balance of 
medications, and eventually finding hope in a seemingly hopeless situation. The book is used in 
introductory psychology courses to familiarize undergraduate students with abnormal 
psychology due to its highly descriptive explanations of symptoms, treatments, side effects of 
neurological drugs, and even the affective reality of the impossibility of living a “normal” life. 
The narrative is a collection of different perspectives including Schiller’s personal memories, 
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family members’ and friends’ inner circle viewpoints, formal hospital records, and Mental 
Health Professionals’ personal and professional remarks on Schiller’s case. This real-world 
perspective provides an in-depth understanding of the illness. It exposes the secrets persons with 
schizophrenia may hide from outsiders and explains why a person might hide those symptoms. 
In addition, Schiller’s parents’ reflections help to explain how their heteronormative expectations 
are unraveled as their awareness of the mental illness transforms into acceptance. 
Conversely, Kiernan’s novel does not seem to be centered on the fictional character 
Imp’s schizophrenic diagnosis. Instead, the story is presented as a ghost story about Imp meeting 
a woman by the name of Eva Canning who may or may not be a mermaid, or possibly a wolf in 
disguise, or maybe both? Although Imp’s schizophrenic diagnosis is explicitly stated at the 
beginning of the novel, it appears to take a backseat while the plot continues. Even though there 
are constant references to the mental illness, it is often mentioned in a round-about way and as 
being mostly insignificant in comparison to the mystery of who and what Eva is or the 
importance of Imp’s relationship with her trans-girlfriend Abalyn. The “haunting” Imp 
experiences takes on a supernatural quality to readers while Imp mentions off-handedly her 
schizophrenic life such as meetings with her psychologist and personifying the many pills she 
must take every day. For this reason, the uniqueness of the story lies in the style and form of 
narration. There are several levels of narration of which the main character with schizophrenia is 
also the fictionalized schizophrenic author and the schizophrenic narrator in the fictional novel 
we are reading. Disregarding the diagnose, Imp the author/narrator/character identifies the source 
of her discomforting confusion of memories, compulsive counting or writing, and other intrusive 
symptoms as being attributable to Eva rather than her schizophrenia. 
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Critics may be hesitant to look too deeply into the psychological reality of Kiernan’s 
novel due to literary representations and signifiers of language rarely being literal. Although 
form and content can offer insight into the meaning of a text, scholars should not disregard that 
occasionally authors may actually refrain from being ambiguous. It is possible that what comes 
across as unworldly is intended to be realistic, yet in a situation where reality is twisted by the 
distortions of a psychological illness. For this same reason, psychologists could investigate the 
form and style of a disorganized mind by viewing a fictional narrative character as a case study. 
Doing this may provide insight into the universal human experience via emotions and 
motivations and lend toward a more holistic approach. 
The first section of this paper will assert the need for scholars to intertwine Psychology 
and Literary Studies. The two fields are currently treated as distinct fields despite cross-
discipline influences throughout history. I will discuss how psychology theories have already 
contributed to Literary Studies, yet the question remains on how literary critical analysis, infused 
with a scientific psychological perspective can contribute to destigmatizing mental illnesses. This 
paper will show that mental illness such as Schizophrenia challenges heteronormative 
expectations by exposing the compulsory able-mindedness that permeates our lives. The 
psychological narrative allows literary critics to observe the relationship between the lived 
experiences of persons with mental illness and other non-normative communities. Shared 
experiences of exclusion from heteronormative societal expectations, labels of imperfections, 
and the forced embodiment (despite non-physical considerations), expose the compulsory 
normative assumptions over minds and bodies of othered populations.  
The following section glosses psychological accounts of schizophrenia; I focus 
particularly on auditory hallucinations from several psychological perspectives, because these 
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are key to Schiller’s and Imp’s hesitations about disclosing their symptoms. Next, I address the 
“othering” nature of stigmas and confront the contributing facets of stigmatization such as fear, 
stereotypes, and social control. Furthermore, I attend to the opposing definitions of literary ghost 
stories and psychological ghostwriting.  I discuss the topic of schizophrenic authorship which 
will deal with authors who have a schizophrenic diagnosis and their need to separate themselves 
from their fictional work. Despite their obstacles, these authors may be writing schizophrenic 
characters in order to educate audiences to dispel some of the inaccuracies and injustices 
surrounding mental illness. Indeed, this paper will show how Kiernan manipulates her reader’s 
into “experiencing” schizophrenia firsthand. Finally, I argue for utilizing a psychological-literary 
critical perspective to discover “hidden” meanings in Kiernan’s text. These meanings include 
how to investigate the issues of narrative style and (dis)trusting the narrator from a new angle 
that would be lost if critics were to use only one perspective, either Psychology or Literary 
Studies. In this paper, I will be intermingling the science of abnormal psychology in combination 
with literary, feminist, disability and queer studies. Doing so provides an example how to braid 
these two fields together, but my research also adds to the discussion of the importance of 
converging the science of psychology with the humanitary studies of literature. Thus, I 
contribute to the body of literary analyses in feminist disability critique within queer studies. 
 
PSYCHOLOGY AND LITERATURE: A TWO-WAY RELATIONSHIP  
Currently, Psychology and Literary Studies treat each other as two distinct fields even 
though psychological theories have influenced literary critiques. In literary courses, students 
often learn about Freud or Jung, yet other theorists tend to remain in the shadows; nevertheless, 
Abdolbaghi Rezaei and Seyyed Hassan Seyyedrezaei achknowledge the contributions of 
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psychological theories on literary critical perspectives. One example the authors offer is that the 
literary criticism Postmodernism is derived from the humanistic psychologist Carl Rodgers’ 
theory of individual sense, which identifies that “the meaning of a literary text relies on the 
individual understanding of the reality existed within the text” (Rezaei and Hassan Seyyedrezaei 
1909). Other examples include Maslow’s and Rogers’ openness to experience in New Criticism, 
Freud’s obvious impact on Psychoanalytic Criticism, and lesser-known inspirations of Rogers’ 
Organismic Trusting and Experiential Freedom in Postmodernism, Deconstruction, and Reader 
Response (Rezaei and Hassan Seyyedrezaei 1909-10).  As we can see, psychology and literary 
criticisms have already been interwoven throughout history.  
In an effort to move beyond disciplinary divisions, Jeffrey Williams praises an emerging 
tradition of blending the sciences with the humanities to establish hybrid fields, or rather new 
multidisciplinary fields of study. He contends that crossing the science of psychology with the 
humanitarian studies of literature “charges disciplines like English, foreign languages, history, 
and philosophy to explain their research outside the confines of their academic fields” so that 
they may enter into the public sphere in more meaningful ways (26). Here, Williams argues that 
creating new combinations increases scholarly interest and incites new research, methods, and 
results in many different areas of scholarship.  One new expanse of multidisciplinary approaches 
is what he calls the public humanities which “aims to represent what the humanities themselves 
are doing to a wider public” (26). In essence, the purpose of this type of integration would be to 
establish and develop a discourse on how literary fiction based on psychological theories might 
have an impact on societal views and/or perspectives.  
Another article, produced by the collaboration between doctorates in Literature, 
Philosophy, and Psychology, defines and differentiates the diverse interdisciplinary relationships 
9 
 
between psychology and literature. Rosemary Conceição dos Santos, João Camilo dos Santos, 
and José Aparecido da Silva address the merging of psychology and literature by informing 
scholars of the various ways in which psychology is used in understanding the author and how 
literature could be interpreted through a psychological lens in several ways. The interdisciplinary 
topic ranges from the Psychology of literature (including but not limed to the study of the author 
and their history, the creative process, and the psychological theories in literature) to psychology 
in Literature (such as a psychological perspective of interpretation in reader response, characters, 
and environmental aspects literature). Even as Literary Studies benefit from psychology due to 
“the description of the behavior and inner experience of an individual as a spontaneous activity, 
the continuity between the different degrees of problem solving and of the creative capacity and 
the attempt to interpret the unconscious life through dynamic forces,” the relationship is mutual 
(Conceição dos Santos, Camilo dos Santos, and Aparecido da Silva 10). Studying literature from 
a psychological perspective allows scholars trained in psychology to critique and analyze 
authors, creative processes, characters, and reader response as psychologic studies.  
Likewise, Badegül Can Emir writes, “there exists a two-way relationship based on mutual 
interaction between literature and psychology, in the form of evaluation of a literary work with 
the resources of psychology and obtaining psychological truths from a literary work” (Emphasis 
added 49). Psychological truths are empirically tested theories which have yet to be disproven. 
For example, theoretical concepts such as universal emotions are consistent behaviors that are 
present at birth and are seen across the globe regardless of culture. Can Emir’s argument is that 
both fields, Literary Studies and Psychology, benefit from each other’s work in understanding 
human nature/behaviors by referencing literature’s “text, its theme, the author, and the reader” as 
well as the characters themselves posing plausible case studies (Can Emir 50-51). It makes sense 
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to accept that “[p]sychological elements will be present in literary works as long as humans [or 
evem human-like emotions in non-human entities] are the theme of the texts… [and] since 
psychology explores mental processes [among many other aspects of the human] it will also 
provide insights into literature” (Can Emir 50). The most prevelant aspect to remember from this 
interdisciplinary rhetoric is that “[i]nterpreting a literary work involves approaching its 
characters and events as if they could exist in real life and studying characters’ emotions, 
thoughts, and behaviors. Psychology is the most important platform on which this analysis can 
be done” (Can Emir 50). This is because by treating fictional characters as realistic 
representaions of human behaivors, the concepts of universal emotions, and basic human 
motivations would be one way in which literature can utilize psychology in the production and 
interpretation of literary characters. Similarly, these same concepts can be further developed by 
the psychological analysis of the characters and their actions.  Can Emir’s article is not only an 
explanation of how the fields of Psychology and Literary Studies are intimately linked, but it is 
also an active call to literary critics and psychologists alike to interpret literature with a 
psychological perspective. This paper builds on Can Emir’s call “to provide literary psychology 
lessons in the university departments of literature and psychology in order to train specialists and 
to encourage reaserch in this area” (54). We need scholars trained in both fields with functional 
knowledge of how the two work together. 
 
COMPULSORY ABLE-MINDEDNESS: STIGMATIZING SCHIZOPHRENIA   
In addition to advancements in Psychological and Literary Studies, a psychological 
literary critique may show how mental illnesses such as schizophrenia disrupts heteronormative 
expectations and compulsory able-bodiedness by problematizing the concept of compulsory 
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able-mindedness. The most direct way to explain this is by noticing how the narrators in our two 
texts, by receiving diagnoses of mental disorders, go against both the standards of 
heteronormativity and compulsory able-bodiedness thus entering into queer studies and feminist 
disability critique. Robert McRuer’s main argument that “able-bodied identity is at this juncture 
even more naturalized than heterosexual identity” means that there is a greater expectancy to be 
mentally and physically “normal” than it is to be heterosexual (302-303). We can see how this is 
so in both Shiller’s parents’ accounts as well as in a conversation between Imp and Abalyn.  
Schiller’s text discusses how heteronormative expectations for both her and her parents 
were shattered by the schizophrenic diagnosis. As her father (Marvin) reports, “She was 
supposed to go to college, meet a wonderful man, get married, have children and live a long and 
happy life” all of which is no longer a possibility in his mind post-diagnosis (Schiller 45). The 
diagnosis immediately disturbs the heterosexual assumptions for Schiller, but the destruction of 
her able-bodiedness also annihilates previously established heteronormative functions of those 
around her too. Schiller’s mother Nancy discloses that she grew up daydreaming about getting 
married and having children, and even describes Lori as her “perfect child” (62). However, the 
emergence of the mental disorder destabilizes Nancy’s heteronormative expectations for herself 
and she complains, “our traditional roles were jarred. I had always been a wife and mother. He 
[Marvin] was the breadwinner… I had depended on Marvin. Now, suddenly he was helpless…he 
had no power…” (64). This shows that Schiller having a mental disability traverses not only her 
own heteronormative potentials, but it also derails her parents’ traditional roles. In Nancy’s 
perspective, Marvin is no longer the family’s protector and stable financial provider, and she is 
no longer the perfect, well-put-together, male-dominated, submissive mother of a perfectly 
healthy and happy daughter. Schiller being mentally compromised reaches outside and beyond 
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herself, extending into the social circle surrounding her. The definitive mental diagnosis 
crumbles all aspects of Schiller’s and her family’s expectant heteronormative life.  
Kiernan, on the other hand, takes an alternative approach to juxtapose mental illness with 
compulsory able-bodiedness and heteronormative expectations. In a conversation between Imp 
and Abalyn, Kiernan writes (225-26): 
“You’re a brave lady, Imp. I swear I couldn’t live with shit like 
that. You’re stronger than me.” 
 
“No, I’m not. I’m just used to it. I haven’t ever been any other 
way. Not really. Besides, you’ve been through at least as much. I 
can’t imagine having the courage to do what you’ve done.” I was 
talking about coming out and her reassignment surgery, but she 
knew that without me having to spell it all out. 
 
Through this conversation of “Imp and Abalyn’s Self-Congratulatory Society of Mutual 
Admiration,” Kiernan, a trans-woman diagnosed with several mental disorders, is attempting to 
explain to her readers how having a mental illness is analogous to being a trans-woman. This is 
not to say that Imp is a lesbian because she has schizophrenia, nor is it to say being a trans-
woman is a mental illness, but it is to say that any and all expectations, heteronormative or 
otherwise, are non-existent and that a person with a mental illness is socially dis-communicated 
from society like a trans-person often is. By being proud of one another’s strength in the face of 
adversity, Kiernan’s characters acknowledge that although the struggles are by no means the 
same, they are parallel in difficulty. McRuer argues that “the system of able-bodiedness that 
produces disability is thoroughly interwoven with the system of compulsory heterosexuality that 
produces queerness…” (301). Ultimately, he is claiming that a person with a disability, may it be 
mental or physical, is queered, minoritized, and stigmatized in a society that values 
heteronormative standards and able-body expectations.  
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Elizabeth Donaldson speaks to the problem of literature romanticizing mental illness and 
she offers instead “a new feminist theory of embodiment of mental illness” in which “mental 
illnesses [are] physical impairments” and that text should be interpreted in that light (95). She 
refers to Lennard Davis’ concept of the impairment-disability system (similar to Gayle Rubin’s 
sex-gender system— physical social) and states that this approach “has been particularly useful 
for people in the disability rights movement, who combat stigma and who protect the civil rights 
of people with disabilities: by shifting attention away from the biological ([body/]impairment) to 
the social ([public/]disability) [or rather a ‘socio-medical condition’,] one can effectively identify 
and address discrimination” (Donaldson 95, 105). McRuer’s thoughts on embodying disabilities 
seems to confirm Donaldson’s claim, but he explains, “Since queerness and disability both have 
the potential to disrupts the performance of able-bodied heterosexuality, both must be safely 
contained—embodied…” (McRuer 305). He seems to suggest that embodiment is not what he 
wishes, but that this is how it is. By placing queerness in the body, it can be controlled by those 
who wish to control it. When heteronormativity is in a state of crisis and threatened by 
queerness, embodiment is the solution to contain the threat and maintain the status quo. For this 
reason, moving beyond physicality might be a better alternative and more applicable for mental 
disabilities. Because mental illnesses disrupts both concepts of able-bodiedness and heterosexual 
identities, we could extend McRuer’s conclusions of able-bodiedness into able-mindedness.  
On a physical level, a neurological chemical imbalance is considered abnormal, and yet 
psychologists do not even fully understand what a balanced brain (physical), let alone what a 
“normal” mind (non-physical) looks like. Despite the current concept that mental illness 
supposedly originate at physical neurological level, heteronormativity, able-bodiedness, and 
able-mindedness are all “linked in their mutual impossibility and in their mutual 
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incomprehensibility” (McRuer 304). This simply means that society unfortunately rejects 
anything outside of heteronormative, able-bodiedness, and able-mindedness because they should, 
by current societal beliefs, not “naturally” exist. Furthermore, mental illnesses extend beyond the 
physical constraints due to how it is expressed in a non-physical realm and so, in essence, mental 
disabilities are both socially and physically stigmatized (socio-medical is the term Donaldson 
uses). However, in support of the necessary distinction between the physical and the mental, we 
turn to Mary Wood, who when writing of schizophrenic authors states, “Such a writer—the 
writer marked by a diagnosis of mental illness—is already framed by the reader as unreliable, 
more so than even the physically ill writer who is understood to be sane” (187). This promotes 
the idea that as able-bodiedness is “more naturalized” than heteronormativity, able-mindedness is 
“more naturalized” than able-bodiedness. With the understanding that McRuer claims non-
heterosexuality is less normalized than able-bodiedness (more acceptable), then in turn, we also 
see that able-bodiedness is less normalized (more acceptable) than able-mindedness.  
Mental disabilities complicate the concept of able-bodiedness because even if the 
physical aspect of the illness resides in the physical brain, the effects of the “abnormality” is in 
direct relation to the mental, emotional, and cognitive non-material domains in both social and 
self-identifying situations; therefore, able-mindedness conflates aspects of the physical, 
emotional, and mental. Schizophrenia thus proves itself to be disruptive in mind, body, gender 
performance, sexuality, and every other societal expectation. Also, as we will see, even reality 
itself (subjective or objective) is destabilized. Before we really get into the psychological root of 
societal rejection of compulsory able-mindedness by means of stigmatization, first we must 
define schizophrenia in a scientific, yet humanistic sense. 
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Schizophrenia, as deemed by The American Psychiatric Association (APA) is a psychotic 
disorder which lies on a spectrum and is often characterized by symptoms of delusions and 
hallucinations. (For a case specific scientific definition, refer to the most recent edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-#), the only APA approved 
diagnostic tool therapists use to diagnose patients with various disorders. The text contains 
information including, but not limited to, criterion, features, frequency in cultures, race, and sex, 
development, and course, as well as genetic and environmental factors).  
However, for our purposes, Dr. Jane Doller, Schiller’s therapist in The Quiet Room, 
maintains a humanistic approach to mental illness which was unusual at the time of Schiller’s 
initial diagnosis. In Doller’s perspective, when relating Lori’s case, Doller states, “Lori clearly 
had full-blown schizophrenia: She was openly psychotic, paranoid and hostile. Her thoughts 
were disordered; her concentration and her mental abilities were impared” (233). Genreally 
speaking, Doller explains how the illness effects how a person who suffers from schizophrenia 
relates to the outside world by saying, “the thing that has broken is the person’s ability to relate 
to another person. The thing that breaks is whatever it is that connects people to their 
environment, that allows them to recognize another person as someone outside themselves…” 
(235). Meaning that a person with schizophrenia has trouble knowing what comes from within 
themselves and thus within their own control and that which is, or is from, an external source. It 
is an inability to understand what is separate from their own person and an inability to 
understand other people’s perspectives, thoughts, feelings, and intentions. This is the essence of 
a psychological term called Theory of Mind (ToM). Among the above listed symptoms, 
according to Martin Brüne, a psychotherapy psychiatrist, schizophrenia is often associated with a 
lack of ToM which involves the ability (or inability) to understand another’s intentions, thoughts, 
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feelings, and/or behaviors, thus impairing the sufferer’s abilities “to cross check his or her 
inference against reality” (21). Brüne discusses how ToM is often either limited in schizophrenic 
patients or is hyperactive which in either case creates paranoia due to an inability to accurately 
interpret social signals from others and/or themselves (23). In other words, because a person with 
schizophrenia has an  inability to distinctly identify and recognize people, places, things, 
emotions, and behaviors as being separate from themselves, they cannot understand where they 
themselves end and another begins, and vice versa. Simply put, sufferers cannot assess how other 
people may feel nor that their own behaviors are in fact their own actions within their control. 
Yet another way of understanding schizophrenia is to read Nancy’s account of it after 
doing some novice research on her own. Originally, Nancy was unfamiliar with the illness and 
because she had watched a movie with a character with a personality disorder, she had even 
mistaken her daughter’s diagnosis for “split personality.” However, she read some books only to 
learn, “my ideas had been wrong… [schizophrenia is] a brain disease, a chemical imbalance… 
hallucinate… voices commanding them… talking about them… delusions… very sick… 
sometimes drugs helped… sometimes drugs didn’t help... Very often… don’t get better… 
institutions… no hope” (71-72). Part of the reason The Quiet Room is being taught in 
Introduction to Psychology courses is to circumvent previous misconceptions students may have 
gained from other sources such as movies and other forms of media while encouraging class 
discussions of controversial theories of the etiology and development of mental illnesses. As we 
see from Nancy’s primary source of reliance of entertainment, students are likely to have their 
own experiences and preconceptions of mental illnesses. Schiller’s accurate portrayal of living 
with schizophrenia and her experiences with treatments allow students to gain a better 
17 
 
understanding of the illness by reading the text and discussing the content with psychology 
teachers and classmates. 
 
THE OTHERED: HEARING SILENCED VOICES  
Unlike the general public, psychologists determine a diagnosis by relying primarily on 
the criteria of symptoms. Although several mental disorders are classified as having symptoms of 
delusions, relatively few diagnoses have general hallucinations and even less have auditory 
symptoms. Although hallucinations can affect any of the five sense, the one I will be focusing on 
is auditory hallucinations which the DSM-5 describes as being “the most common in 
schizophrenia… usually experienced as voices... that are perceived as distinct from the 
individual’s own thoughts” (APA 87). Sarah Kamens notes that a person with auditory 
hallucinations, or ‘voice hearing,’ is “a person who hears voices, or a voice hearer, experiences 
sounds (e.g., human speech), messages, and/or other meanings that others do not… it is the 
experience of an addressee who receives a communication from a seemingly distal, invisible, 
otherwise anomalous source” (254-255). In an effort to explain auditory hallucinations, Doller 
asserts, “what has also broken is the brain’s ability to process emotions and thoughts… Emotions 
that would normally be comfortably catalogued as unacceptable take on a life of their own as 
voices that seem more real than the real world outside” (Schiller 235). In Doller’s view, voices 
are a means for schizophrenic patients to inwardly express emotions they no longer know how to 
classify, albiet the feelings are often over-exagerated and very frequently self-condeming. 
When first introducing her Voices, for example, Schiller uses descriptive words such as 
terrible, evil, torture, fear, vicious, screaming, commanding, and pounding (6). Her Voices are 
not those pleasant and friendly voices in a person’s mind encouraging them to push forward nor 
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are the slightly undermining voices of the negative self-talk we often discover swirling in our 
subconscious minds. As we learn from Schiller, the Voices are much worse, much louder, and 
always intruding.  Schiller writes, “When the Voices began to shriek, I had to stay composed… 
hiding the Voices began to take up much of my time and energy. When the Voices began to 
screech and cackle, I looked to the floor… Sometimes they got so bad that I had to make up 
some excuse… and leave the room” (17, 21). Schiller discloses to her readers why she felt the 
need to hide the Voices and states, “Week after week I met with him [her first therapist], yet I 
couldn’t speak. I couldn’t talk about the Voices. It was too dangerous… They threatened me, and 
I believed them. If I squealed on the Voices, they might kill me. If I ratter on them, the person I 
told would have to die” (Schiller 24). Here, readers learn that persons with schizophrenia have a 
reluctance to discuss their symptoms as a conscious effort to protect themselves and others.  
With this awareness, we become cognizant that Imp suffers from auditory hallucinations, 
yet there is an unwillingness to fully disclose the extent of her symptoms to the readers. One of 
the few times Imp directly mentions her symptoms is when she explains that she will frequently 
go for drives, “This is something I do sometimes, when I can’t sleep. When my head is too full 
of thoughts, voices, the past” (34). Despite this passing disclosure, Imp hardly discusses the 
voices she hears. One explicit example of Imp having auditory hallucinations is when she 
describes to her therapist “the one symptom that caused me [Imp] the most difficulty, that 
seemed to lie at the root of everything that shut me down and made it hard to be alive” (102). 
Imp says, “there’s static. White noise. Or someone whispering. And slowly that sound gets 
louder and louder… eventually, it grows so loud you can’t hear anything else… that sound won’t 
stop” (103). The therapist then tells Imp what she described is called “intrusive thoughts. 
Involuntary and unwelcome thoughts that can’t be shut out no matter how hard someone tries” 
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(103). This is undeniable evidence that Imp suffers from the intrusive thoughts of auditory 
hallucinations.  
Another irrefutable indicator Imp suffers from auditory hallucinations is the ringing of a 
telephone. Although Imp never mentions it to us before, Abalyn asks her, completely out of the 
blue, “Why do you answer the phone when it hasn’t rang [sic]?” (120). Of course, Imp instantly 
corrects her grammar, just like we mentally did already, thus distracting us from the deeper 
meaning of the question—the meaning being that Imp does in fact have auditory hallucinations. 
Schiller describes how ordinary objects, like a telephone, became hostile. She tells us, “It rang 
again. Again no one. And then again, and again, and again. Always that same vacant feeling at 
the other end of the line… I became terrified of using the phone. But I couldn’t tell anyone why” 
(Schiller 17-18). Cross referencing Schiller’s text with Imp’s off-handed mention of the phone is 
a way Imp confesses her struggles without directly stating the importance of that information. 
Schiller tells us, “There almost never seemed to be a time when the Voices left me alone… The 
Voices were with me nearly constantly… They followed me into the night, and followed me into 
my dreams. I went for days without sleeping (23). We can only imagine how challenging it must 
have been for Imp to confide in her readers without being too direct. After all, with our 
understanding of Schiller’s experiences and the description to Imp’s therapist, the voices and 
sounds are ever present, yet the suffers do not feel like they can safely warn us. Hiding the 
symptoms and voices may have seemed necessary since the Voices threaten her life and the lives 
of the people she wanted to tell.  
The other reason why schizophrenic person’s may hide their symptoms is due to fear of 
stigma and loss of social power. Lerita Coleman Brown mentions that “Some people are more 
capable of concealing their stigmas or escaping from the negative social consequences of being 
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stigmatized” (149), and Imp lets us know that she is one of those people when she says, “The 
dreams were making me sick, but I have always been good at hiding my craziness” (115). 
Kamens also points out that many people hide their symptomatic voices for the simple fact that 
“when reported to a mental health professional, voices… act as signifiers for their own lack of 
discursive power” (260). This means that if a person hears voices, they are automatically 
considered an unreliable source and lose the autonomy of voice since professionals are only 
interested in the existence of voices, or lack thereof, without a care for what the voices actually 
say. This fear of the loss of social status and the destruction of personal accountability is best 
explained by the consequences of stigmatization.  
Aspects of stigmatization include fear from lack of awareness of the development and 
course of disorders, social control by means of socializing, and stereotypes. Together, these 
forces create a social process of othering persons with mental disorders. Brown outlines a 
literature review of stigmas, specifically the probable causes and the possible reason for their 
continuation from a sociological perspective (cultural and socializing orientations and 
maintaining). Her proposal is “one that takes into account its [stigma’s] behavioral, cognitive, 
and affective components and reveals that stigma is a response to the dilemma of difference” 
(Brown 147). When we perceive differences in each other, we determine that some people are 
similar to us, and the others are “othered.”  These othered persons, or rather stigmatized people, 
are subject to three primary aspects of stigmatizing: fear (affective), stereotyping (cognitive), and 
social control (behavioral) (Brown 157). 
Fear is the affective response to being unfamiliar with mental illnesses. A lack of 
awareness results in a lack of understanding, and a lack of understanding often results in fear, 
and fear, Brown proposes “may be instrumental in the perpetuation of stigma… fear is not a 
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natural but an acquired response to differences or stigmas” (150). We can see how fear derives 
from misconceptions and misunderstanding when we read Nancy’s reflections after hearing the 
diagnosis “schizo-affective disorder:” “Schizophrenia? What did that word mean? I didn’t 
understand it… I didn’t know what they were talking about…schizophrenia meant split 
personality, didn’t it? I had heard about schizophrenia, and I had seen some movies about it,” 
then she immediately goes into a description of a film about an entirely different disorder (70). 
Even without prior misconceptions, Nancy makes a very valid point about the disorder, 
“schizophrenia? The word itself is horrifying” (71).  
Brown comes to the conclusion that “fear usually stems from not knowing about the 
etiology of a condition, its predictability, and its course” (155). The etiology, or the cause, of a 
disorder is often attributed to genetic influences, as in gender and race, or environmental factors 
such as class and upbringing. The predictability refers to how accurate professionals can predict 
who will get the illness, while course refers to how the illness will be expressed throughout a 
person’s life. The matter of cause is addressed in Schiller’s memoir in Marvin’s reflections. In 
Marvin’s professional experience in Psychology, the parents, due to parental techniques during 
upbringing, are often to blame. He reasons, “there was only one cause for all mental illnesses, 
even the most severe: a faulty upbringing. Everything was tied to the way you were raised” 
(Schiller 45). He continues on with this line of thought by saying, “Everyone believed that it was 
early life experiences that were behind mental disorders. A patient with serious mental problems 
had been subject at an early age to unacceptable pressures, to confusing messages, or to some 
destructive behavior on the part of the parents” (Schiller 45). This self-blame eventually turns 
into a self- punishment, “It’s all your fault, I thought. Lori is very sick, and you caused it. You 
weren’t affectionate enough. You didn’t pay enough attention to her. You pushed her too hard. 
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You were too demanding. It’s you who caused her problems. You. You. You” (emphasis added 
Schiller 48).  Due to this fear of himself being to cause, Marvin of course adjusts his behavior to 
his son Steven and begins treating him differently by not pushing him as hard to succeed. 
Assuming the parental influences may be the source of the illness and the fear of not knowing 
the inheritability of the illness results in the obliteration of Marvin’s expectations for all of his 
children. 
Conversely, rather than emphasizing the nurturing side of the spectrum (parental 
upbringing), Kiernan utilizes the nature (biological) explanation. Imp directly addresses her 
family history of mental illness directly by sharing that her mother died in a “hospital for the 
insane” and she was there “because she was insane… because she was insane… she was insane” 
(1). When moving on to her grandmother, Imp discloses that “she was also a crazy woman,” but 
“No one put her away in a hospital, or tried to pretend she wasn’t crazy,” yet the grandmother 
ultimately commits suicide (2). In addition, Imp opens the possibility to the reader that she 
herself, as per knowledge of the hereditariness of mental illnesses go, is also mentally 
compromised. As if expecting the reader to come to the awareness on their own, yet just in case 
the reader lacks prior knowledge of the inheritability of mental illness, Imp clearly states, “I 
didn’t realize I was also insane” at first anyway, yet she then aligns herself with “crazy people” 
using words such as “us” and “we” while at the same time distinguishing herself as separate from 
“sane people” (3). By attributing the illness to hereditary origins, Imp relieves her parents of the 
parental influences of her upbringing being the source of her situation and embodies the mental 
disorder—pulling it out of the mind. Imp uses hereditary to explain the source of the disorder 
which establishes a reason for why she is ill; albeit, with a hint of uncertainty with the claim that 
“schizophrenia might be hereditary, at least in some cases” (emphasis added 4). In effect, this 
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also prepares the reader to see the later conflict of attributing her symptoms to the external 
source of Eva. In either case, schizophrenia removes normative expectations or is embodied. 
Brown promotes the consensus that stigma is a learned response in children due to the 
socialization of parents and role models via cognitive stereotyping and is continued as a means 
of social control where wealth has the upper hand. For example, “attributes or behaviors that 
might otherwise be considered ‘abnormal’ or stigmatized are labeled as ‘eccentric’ among 
persons of power or influence” (Brown 149). In Nancy’s recollection of her mother and her aunt 
she restates a common phrase that leads into awareness, “Poor people are crazy, they say, and 
rich people are eccentric… my mother hadn’t been eccentric. She had been sick… For if Lori 
was schizophrenic, then so was my mother” (Schiller 82). Nancy’s account goes on to discuss 
her feelings as a child surrounded by loved ones who were just “seeking attention” or “visiting 
family”, and “what was never spoken about,” yet she uses words such as shame, fear, 
embarrassment, frightened/frightening, terrified, and humiliation to describe how she felt as a 
child and how she now feels as a mother of a person with schizophrenia (Schiller 82-83). Nancy 
then proceeds to discuss how her mother and her aunt fit into all the stereotypical ideas about 
“crazy” people such as unkempt hair, poor dental hygiene, and uncontrollable screaming (83). 
Thus, continuing the stereotypical perception of mental illness in physical terms.  
Marvin has a more social-centered understanding of stigma than his wife with his 
primary concern being on the social consequences—the behavioral side of stigma in relation to 
other people outside the immediate family circle. After Schiller’s first suicide attempt, Marvin’s 
primary concern is the social stigma of Lori’s actions and he writes, “In my mind, the most 
important help she needed was to make sure that nothing of this ever came to light… I knew she 
could carry a psychiatric label for a long time—if not forever. I didn’t want my daughter to be 
24 
 
stigmatized” (41). He comforts his daughter saying, “‘no one will ever know you were here. It 
will be all over.’… I didn’t see Lori’s problems as serious. She didn’t need to stay in a psych 
ward. She isn’t mentally ill. She just had a few problems” (42).  Although one might want to 
criticize Marvin’s actions as being insensitive and even narcissistic about his public image, he 
has a point. Brown acknowledges that “Another detrimental aspect of stigmatization is the 
practice of treating people, such as the ex-con and ex-mental patient who are attempting to 
reintegrate themselves into society, as if they still had the stigma” (154). This is to say that labels 
carry on much longer than temporary, when they are temporary, conditions. Marvin’s idea of 
parental protection via concealment of mental illness continues into Nancy’s statement as well. 
Marvin had told Nancy, “If we let people know about this, no one will ever let her forget it… It 
will put a terrible stigma on her. When she gets out, she will have to put this behind her. It will 
be impossible if people know where she has been” (63). In Marvin’s mind, Schiller’s attempted 
suicide was a momentary lapse of judgement due to stress rather than a life-long illness. He had 
not yet realized that Schiller has a mental disorder and so he was more concerned about her 
reputation and her future. As Brown notes, “These fears are grounded in a realistic assessment of 
the negative social consequences of stigmatization and reflect the long-term social and 
psychological damage to individuals resulting from stigma” (156). Once a person is hospitalized 
for psychiatric reasons, the label stays with a person throughout their life. 
Nevertheless, people suffer the negative social effects of mental illness, even if they do 
not understand what is happening to the individual, because stigmatization is often inevitable for 
schizophrenic persons and their loved ones. The chapter written by “the other Lori”, a friend of 
Schiller’s, encapsulates what uninformed individuals believe about persons suffering from 
mental disabilities. She writes, “We thought she [Schiller] was trying to get our attention…Some 
25 
 
of us suspected she might be doing drugs… she was seeing a psychiatrist, so obviously the 
problems were being handled… what’s she got to be depressed about?... I was getting tired of 
her funks. I didn’t want to be her caretaker” (30-31). Unfortunately, Brown’s literature review 
comes to find that “Non-stigmatized people, through avoidance and social rejection, often treat 
stigmatized people as if they were invisible, nonexistent, or dead” (156). This relates back to 
McRuer’s assessment that societal pressures to be heteronormative, able-bodied, and able-
minded result in an ostracization. Non-stigmatized persons put a physical and emotional distance 
between themselves and stigmatized people in order to socially distance themselves from the 
association and responsibility of the connection.  
 
APPLIED THEORY TO LITERATURE 
Mental disorders are stigmatized, much like queerness is rejected from heteronormative 
society. By adapting McRuer’s question, we may ask, just as “able-bodied is to be ‘free from 
physical disability,’ [and] just as to be heterosexual is to be ‘the opposite of homosexual’,” in the 
end, wouldn’t people with mental disabilities rather be able-minded? (McRuer 303). If Schiller 
were asked this question, it would probably be a resounding yes (at least initially out of the fear 
of stigma): “I didn’t want to be a crazy person. People shunned crazy people. They feared them. 
Worse, they called the men in the white coats to come put them in straitjackets and take them 
away to an insane asylum. I didn’t want that to be me” (16). As Brown claims, “Normality 
becomes the supreme goal for many stigmatized individuals until they realize that there is no 
precise definition of normality except what they would be without their stigma” (155). In other 
words, people define normalcy as being themselves, but without the alleged negative 
characteristic that disengages them from being like those who are not stigmatized. Rather than 
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defining themselves by their similarities with others, they define themselves as “abnormal” 
because their disability creates a difference. And it is their difference from others which they 
would remove from themselves if at all possible. 
 
SUBSECTION HEADER ON GHOSTWRITING 
Stigmatizing also acts as a powerful means of social control in the professional world of 
Psychology. Imp claims to be writing a ghost story, a self-defining term in Literary Studies, but 
the term takes on a different meaning because in the psychological sense, ghostwriting is the 
forgotten memories (ghost) that haunt persons with schizophrenia. While in a state of psychosis, 
a person with schizophrenia is unlikely to remember what they say or do, but observers such as 
nursing staff and psychologists remember and record notes of the patients’ behaviors and 
conversations. Kamens defines ghostwriting, as it is found within medical ghostwriting in 
psychiatric research, as being, “the practice of writing a text to which someone else ultimately 
claims authorship… The ghostwriter is not named as an author in the text; instead, another 
person, typically a physician or other scholar, affixes their name to the published result” (254-
55). Kamens asserts that “ghostwriting sets the stage for or inscribes haunting via a signifying 
process by which the original author unintentionally inscribes life historical meanings—
including their own—into the body of the published text” (emphasis added 258). These personal 
life histories, thus recorded without the memory of the experiencer, become in of themselves, 
hauntings to the sufferers due to their unhomely nature of being “once familiar and unfamiliar” 
(Kamens 258). Referencing Derrida, Kamens claims, “both hearing voices and ghostwriting 
might be viewed as forms of haunting or being haunted” (257). In doing so, Kamens addresses 
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the post-colonial networks of oppression and hauntings between auditory hallucinations and 
ghostwriting. 
Information collected from patients in moments of psychosis, including but not limited to 
self-reports, observations recorded in psychiatric evaluations, nurses’ notes, and other types of 
medical records, are all considered as ghostwriting. Kamens argues that doctors’ reports, nurses’ 
notes and academic publications based on those sources are a form of unethical ghostwriting 
because they take the stories of their patients and make it into their own work. These notes then 
become written document to be filed, studied, to be written about, to become part of someone 
else’s production, and yet, Schiller never gives consent for the use of her own experiences. She 
was unknowingly and unwillingly being ghostwritten without consent due to her illness. On one 
end of the spectrum, “ghostwriting exists on the ‘upper’ or privileged end of this discursive 
hierarchy. Ghostwritten texts are elite and colonizing communications in which the originator’s 
identity vanishes… The nameless origin of the text and the foreclosure of authorship are 
rendered irrelevant” (Kamens 260). Ghostwriting then is “an exclusion not only of the person, 
but also the ways in which persons tell their own histories” (Kamens 261). Interestingly, 
although ultimately psychiatrists are silencing their patients though their diagnoses and then 
stealing their patients’ voices without their consent, we see the use of ghostwriting in Schiller’s 
work as a means of narration. Authors with schizophrenia, such as Schiller and Kiernan, would 
be well aware of psychiatric ghostwriting and are likely to incorporate the experience of it into 
their own writing. Schiller attempts to use the ghostwritings from her history to recreate her own 
story in her own words. By attaching the hauntings of her own ghostwritings into her own story 
within her control, she is reclaiming those reports as her own. 
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Conversely, Imp claims she is writing a ghost story which readers may initially interpret 
as being in the literary sense; however, Kiernan problematizes the term ghostwriting in her novel 
by twisting the literary terminology into the psychological meaning of the word. Offering the 
novel as a possible supernatural experience recontextualizes the phrase “ghostwriting,” bringing 
the uncanniness of real-life hauntings into a fictional and therefore non-threatening atmosphere. 
But as we discover, not everything in this fiction is as it seems on the surface. Imp describes the 
novel as a ghost story containing hauntings, yet we now know, due to an awareness of 
psychology, there is a dual meaning to these two terms. In a one-page interview with Charlene 
Brusso, Kiernan says, “hauntings is [sic] very dear to me. Not the ghostly sort… the 
nonsupernatural [sic] real-world sort (Brusso 39). In this statement, especially by saying “Not the 
ghostly sort” and “nonsupernatural,” we see that Kiernan is actually complicating the literary 
definition of ghost stories because her definition of ghostwriting is psychological in nature, not 
literally. Within The Drowning Girl, Imp proposes that ghosts are rather a transmission of ideas 
in the statement, “Hauntings are memes, especially pernicious thought contagions, social 
contagions that need no viral or bacterial host and are transmitted in a thousand different ways. A 
book…” (12). In a way, Kiernan is mimicking ghostwriting as it is in psychiatry because “ghost 
writing exacts a kind of double haunting, extending the lives of the voices themselves,” and 
likewise, Kiernan extends the life of Imp’s psychological ghosts and hauntings onto her readers 
(Kamens 262). Awareness of Psychology practices affords a unique perspective of the literary 
text that may have otherwise been overlooked. Without having a situational knowledge of 
psychology, critics may focus merely on the meme-esqness of the intertextuality references 
and/or on the literal sense of ghosts. Knowing there are other definitions and forms of ghosts, 
ghostwriting, and hauntings means psychological literary critics have an entirely new perspective 
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of the story as being one that is less of being supernatural and more acting as a social critique. To 
further understand how Kiernan rejects the literary definition of ghostwriting, we must turn to 
her stigmatized position as an author diagnosed with schizophrenia.  
Since authors with schizophrenic diagnoses face the constant oppression of stigma, they 
may feel the need to distance themselves from their fictional works involving mental illness; 
however, it seems these authors also feel the desire to dissipate inaccurate assumptions 
surrounding mental illnesses. Feminist studies has shown that women are often othered or 
unheard in the dominate patriarchal culture, and queer/disability studies have shown how those 
with physical disabilities or mental disorders suffer the same fate. Wood is also an author 
diagnosed with schizophrenia and her book, Life Writing and Schizophrenia discusses a wide 
variety of personal life experiences as an author with a mental disorder, but also includes a 
chapter that dives into a literary critique of Janet Frame’s work as a schizophrenic author. Wood 
discusses the issues of how others, readers and critics, make judgements of Frame based on her 
fictional work and autobiographical texts, stating, “Readers repeatedly connected Frame to her 
mentally ill characters, seeing them as entirely autobiographical” (174). Kiernan discusses her 
diagnosis of various disorders including schizophrenia and she says, “I’ve spent most of my life 
struggling with serious mental illnesses. I’ve been diagnosed as latent schizophrenic, OCD, 
psychogenic seizure disorder, whatever” (Brusso 39), yet her apprehension of readers and critics 
equating personal experiences with her fictional work is probably why Kiernan feels the need to 
emphasize that “[b]oth [The Red Tree and The Drowning Girl] truly are fictionalized 
autobiographies dressed up as fantasy, my own self-administered psychotherapy” (emphasis 
added Brusso 39). Her anticipation of the ostracizing effects of disclosing her own personal 
diagnosis compels her to, as Wood says of Frame’s character Istina Mavet, to “distance herself 
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from her diagnosis of schizophrenia and thus from popular conceptions of this condition” (Wood 
174). Like Frame, Kiernan feels the need to put distance between her own personal life and the 
experiences of her characters.  
We should note that both Schiller’s and Kiernan’s novels are about living with the 
disorder and that both books start with the illness, not end with the diagnoses. Much like how 
many novels end with a marriage, yet relatively few begin with one, instead of the diagnosis 
being a sign of an end to a life, it is actually a beginning to a different life. However in this 
situation, the new life is one of increeased oppression due to intersectionality and what has ended 
are the able-bodied/heteronomative expectations. Both Schiller and Kiernan are authors who 
have dual identities, one being a woman with mental disability and the other being a trans-
woman with a mental disability, and so we must investigate what that means for their ability to 
be heard in the mainstream culture.  
Cathy Cohen emphasizes collective engagement though creating cooperative 
communities between persons of minority groups and her article encourages acts of activism 
though means of utilizing privileges allowed to persons within the groups to instigate civil unity. 
Cohen asserts, “a broadened understanding of queerness must be based on an intersectional 
analysis that recognizes how numerous systems of oppression interact to regulate and police the 
lives of most people… The synthesis of these oppressions creates the condition of our lives…  
the lived experience of existing within and resisting multiple and connected practices of 
domination and normalization” (441). The intersectionality of authors with dual intersectional 
identities are in an exclusive position to spread the word of a dual marginalized groups who are 
frequently silenced within themselves and within society. As we previously discussed, affluence 
plays a role in the differentiations between “eccentric” and “crazy,” but along these same lines, 
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Donaldson reminds us that “[p]sychiatry, feminist critics pointed out, unfairly pathologizes 
women” (92) and Wood discusses how men with the diagnosis are frequently cited as being 
brilliant mathematicians or creative artists, whereas women are “much more likely… be seen as 
physically abject, out-of-control sexually, chaotic in thought, imagination, and speech” (181). 
Even back in 2008, (though perhaps much earlier), feminist contributions to psychiatry and 
psychology were acknowledged and the gendered politics had shed a light on how “women have 
been disproportionately and in some cases falsely diagnosed as mentally ill” (Donaldson 94). 
Wood later states, “The term ‘schizophrenia’ takes on different meanings depending on the 
gender, race, class, or nationality of the subject” (182). The double standard of class and gender, 
even among those with mental illness, only serves to emphasis the oppression schizophrenic 
authors face, and yet white, American, middle to upper class status’ Schiller and Imp are a part 
of are not even among the most oppressed people of the marginalized schizophrenic community 
when class, race, and non-traditional genders are taken into consideration.  
Due to these imposed social challenges, some authors may take a proactive stance to 
inform readers of the imbalance of power and maltreatment of those with mental disabilities. As 
Brown suggests, “some stigmatized individuals question the norms about stigma and attempt to 
change the social environments for their peers” (154-155). Schiller tells readers in her 
introduction that she is not only writing to inform her readers who are not familiar with 
schizophrenia, she is also reaching out to those suffering from the illness. She states, “I want to 
tell others about my journey so that those who have never experienced it will know what life 
inside of my schizophrenic brain has been like, and so that those who are still left behind will 
have hope that they too will find a path out” (Schiller 7). Schiller’s purpose in writing the book is 
not only to reduce stigmatic perceptions and try to foster empathy and understanding in 
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stigmatizers, but also to provide hope for the stigmatized and encourages them to maintain hope 
even when reality seems so unreal.  
Although Kiernan’s purpose is a bit vaguer, much like her novel, she expresses in the 
interview with Brusso that her writing is “fictionalized autobiographies… self-administered 
psychotherapy… [and] most people who’ve never had to live with serious psychological 
disorders have no idea how lucid someone with schizophrenia can be” (Brusso 39). Not only 
does Kiernan’s writings give alternative perspectives of the disorder, provide a sense of 
therapeutic relief for herself, and spread awareness to others, but she also lets Imp “speak in her 
own voice,” a voice which would probably be stolen and silenced in the real-world (Brusso 39). 
Rather than simply telling her readers about what it is like to live with schizophrenia, Kiernan 
prefers to show us by producing an experience.  
By grounding her narrative in a first-person perspective of inner feelings, Kiernan draws 
the reader into the schizophrenic mind to experience it for themselves. What better way to create 
empathy than to make the reader feel, if only for the duration of the novel, how the character 
feels everyday of her life? Kiernan states, “I’ve always been writing about it [her mental 
illnesses] … I finally figured out how to write it, instead of writing about it” (emphasis added for 
clarity 39). This means that Kiernan’s struggle is not writing about mental illnesses or even 
being a writer with mental disorders, rather her effort resides in putting the illness into words so 
that readers could potentially understand it better. Kiernan creates through Imp a voice that 
readers hear in their own minds that is schizophrenic, othered, stigmatized, and often left 
unheard and silenced. Much like Frame, both Schiller and Kiernan aim to “disrupt the public 
discourse on schizophrenia in important ways” primarily “[t]hrough a range of literary 
strategies… [which] link [their] reading audience to the consciousness of those, including at time 
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the narrators themselves, who suffer the most severe forms of psychosis” (Wood 177). 
Essentially, these authors narrate in a way that allows the readers to see life through 
schizophrenic eyes and experiences schizophrenic lives, at least temporarily.  
One unique yet frustrating aspect of Kiernan’s narrative style is that the book forces the 
reader to take notes and do extensive research. As Imp’s mother says, “‘you might want to 
remember it someday’” so “I [being both Imp and myself] should write down what might turn 
out to be important someday” (emphasis added 10-11). The immense number of references 
makes us want to obsessively research to the point where the book makes us feel schizophrenic-
like, or rather paranoid-schizophrenic, like Imp. Simply put, paranoia is when a person has the 
overwhelming sense that someone or something is plotting against them. In our case as readers, 
we feel like there is a story “plot” that we are unaware of happening in the background. The 
illogical belief would be that book is sending us secret messages and hidden meanings meant 
only for us to interpret. The compulsion to write is a possible side effect of schizophrenia as we 
can see in many instances Imp feels unable to control the impulse to write. Imp has a notebook 
with a list of ways her father may have died, but what is most impressive is that we know there 
are at least 316 items on the list (2). She is currently writing a ghost story that she feels 
compelled to finish (12, 28-29). She also writes on napkins (6), records dreams (110-111), hand 
copies an entire story in French (but she cannot read French) (47), relates to us several 
paragraphs from library books and newspapers (59 and throughout), obsessively research 
throughout the entire novel, describes how she writes “odd bits of fiction I sometimes feel 
compelled to write” (105), and most pertinent, obsessively and uncontrollably writing “The 
Lobster Quadrille” by Lewis Carroll through almost 20 pages of the current novel (176-194). 
Imp discloses to us that she has several symptoms that she hides when she writes, “I did my best 
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to keep these rituals [compulsive counting] a secret, and I was deeply, privately ashamed of 
them… I was convinced that unless I did these things, something truly horrible would happen” 
(57). Not only does Kiernan’s writing style and narrative form make us feel the symptom of 
compulsive writing, but she also illuminates the sense of dread that comes with it. 
The reader is also exposed to the inner conflict of a schizophrenic mind. It can easily take 
6 hours to get through the first ten pages of The Drowning Girl on a first reading because each 
outside reference leads to another, and another, and another. Leading the reader, now researcher, 
into a never-ending downward spiral of obsession. We eventually have to block it out—that 
nagging feeling in the back of our minds telling me, this might be important. We should know 
what this is. It connects somehow. Have we heard it before? Do we know what that painting 
looks like? Does it even exist? Why do we not know this already? How can we be so dense to 
not know this information? The negative self-talk eats away at the reader every reference we do 
not investigate. And let us not get started with the names, date, and numbers, which Imp tells us 
are important when she says, “I’ve already filled these pages with a plethora of numbers (mostly 
dates) … Perhaps there’s some secret I’ve unconsciously hidden in all these numbers…” (56). If 
we have managed to forcibly set aside our obsession with researching these innumerable 
numbers, we are forced to doubt ourselves for ignoring them. We wonder if we should go back 
and try to figure out why these numbers are there, what their significance is, what secret has been 
revealed that we missed by ignoring them. We make a mental note to notice them in the future. 
We feel the need to know how it all connects. It has to make sense somehow. It just has to. This 
is how Kiernan wants us to feel. We read, we research obsessively, and we write. And yet, “‘we 
can’t waste all of our time making notes about everything, can we?’... ‘That would be silly, now, 
wouldn’t it?’” (10-11). There is nothing quite like a bit of self-doubt and self-condemnation to 
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kick off a growing list of intrusive thoughts and unwanted feelings we will soon experience 
while reading the rest of the novel.  
 
(DSI)TRUSTING THE NARRATOR: CHANGEABLE RELATIONSHIP 
One major concern in critical literary analysis is the reliability of the narrator, or rather 
the reader’s ability to trust the narrator, yet with a psychological lens, we can understand 
Kiernan’s unique style of narration in a different light. The underlying thread of any narratives is 
the matter of (dis)trusting the narrator to guide the reader through the story, but when we 
question our ability to trust the narrator, the relationship between the reader and the narrator 
settles into a state of dis-ease. As we already discussed, Wood tells us that an author with a 
mental diagnosis “is already framed by the reader as unreliable” (187) and yet Kiernan takes this 
several steps further by distancing her own schizophrenic self from the narrative by creating 
multiple levels of narration. With each level of narration being in its own way unreliable, readers 
cannot be certain who they can trust. 
These multiple layers of narration are just another technique Kiernan uses to engage the 
emotions of her readers into feeling what it is like to have schizophrenia. Although questioning 
the reliability of the narrator is common act among literary critics, the psychological critical 
perspective offers us an entirely new viewpoint of Kiernan’s narrative style. In just the first six 
pages of The Drowning Girl, readers are justifiably uncertain and insecure of the truth of the 
story, the reliability of alternative sources, the stability of the relationship between the reader and 
the narrator, the Voice of the “other narrator,” and even our own interpretations.  
One important aspect of Psychology is understanding schizophrenia and how it effects 
cognitive functioning such as memory, but in literary criticism, lapse in memory can create 
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distrust. After relating a memory of beating the family dog to death, Schiller tells us, “there is 
one big problem with this memory: It isn’t true. It never happened” (9). Here we see the narrator 
exploring their own reliability and acknowledging a lack of accountability in their subjective 
experiences and an inability to be objective in (false) memories leads readers to determine there 
is an inability in the narrator to even trust themselves. Similarly, Imp warns her readers that her 
“memory’s not very good” and she considers her own story as a “provisional truth” (20-21). 
Laura Dietz, mentions William Flesch and his concept of ‘the puzzle of narrative interest’ in 
which the question is: what is “the point of telling stories that aren’t true, and don’t pretend to be 
true[?]” (148).  Imp askes this same question of her readers when she writes, “there’s no point 
doing this thing if all I can manage is a lie…”, which seems to be a viable truth claim; “Which is 
not to say every word will be factual…,” truth claim rescinded; “Only that every word will be 
true…,” truth claim again; “ Or as true as I can manage…” (emphasis added 6). This back and 
forth of truth-claims causes readers to doubt the accuracy of the narrator’s account of the events 
which emphasizes the uncertainty found within the narrator. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
uncertainty within the reader is very much intended and is being purposefully established. It is 
not until later in the story when learning there are two memories of meeting Eva that readers 
realize how compromised her memory really is. In Imp’s mind, there really are two Evas. In 
addition, Imp speaks to the medications she is on and discloses that she has “only tried” to 
commit suicide herself, compared to her mother and grandmother who had succeeded, “And only 
once. Or twice” (5). This immediate self-correcting indicates that the narrator is not even sure of 
herself and her own past actions. A reader unfamiliar with psychotic disorders may think that one 
should be able to recount how many attempts of suicide one has attempted.  
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In moments of psychosis, recollection is unreliable due to the disorder’s effects on 
psychological concepts of memory, cognition, affect, and speech, and therefore we must turn to 
alternative sources to fill in the missing gaps. In Schiller’s novel, the author relies on the 
narrations of other sources, including the ghostwritings of hospital records and the accounts of 
family members and other loved ones, to fill in the inevitable lapses of memory. The novel 
portrays “Medical Records” as a “credible” source to fill in the gaps of her memory, in which the 
nursing notes state the patient is having, “episode[s] of sever auditory hallucinations coupled 
with intense psychomotor agitation… She stated she knows what to tell the doctors in order to let 
them discharge her… It became clearly evident in discussion how tormented she is by these 
voices and how had she is fighting to resist their commands… ‘They’ll kill me if I tell.’” (52). 
These are Schiller’s experiences, some even her own words, yet she cannot remember it 
happening.   
Kiernan plants the seed of distrust of professionals in her readers a different way. Imp 
shares how she sought professional help from therapists, is diagnosed as having disorganized 
schizophrenia, and is then later diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenia (4). The changeability of 
diagnoses instills doubt into the reader’s mind the abilities of therapists to accurately diagnose 
their patients. The next source of unease comes from Imp telling the reader of how she has “not 
yet disclosed” seemingly trivial information to her therapist out of a mild fear of creating trouble 
(Kiernan 5). If Imp is withholding information from a professional who is only trying to help her, 
why should we trust the professionals if she doesn’t? 
As we discussed previously, once a person is known to be hearing voices, professionals 
no longer consider them a plausible source of information. Schiller is no longer able to tell her 
own story, but what’s more is that others are telling it for her. The medical records state under 
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the title of “Informants,” “Patient, unreliable. Parents, reliable” (Schiller 74). We now 
understand the details from Schiller herself is questionable, yet there is the claim that other 
sources provide a dependable bases of information. Nevertheless, a few short pages later, Nancy 
states, “We played little games with the social workers… We made dates and didn’t keep them… 
It was our little revenge” (Schiller 80). Schiller’s parents were angry with the hospital staff due 
to staff turn overs, being told to give up hope, and an overall sense of feeling cheated out of a 
“normal” life for their daughter. From this confession though, readers learn that the gap-fillers, 
such as the “reliable” parents, are not as consistent and dependable as we are led to believe due 
to their fear of social stigma and otherness the diagnosis creates within them. In effect, we realize 
that we cannot even trust the accounts of these informational gap-fillers, because even those 
sources are open to inaccuracies and dishonesty.  
The stability of the relationship between the narrator and the reader is also put into 
question. Right from the first page of The Drowning Girl, we understand there are several levels 
of narration when Imp writes, “she typed… she typed… I also typed” (Kiernan 1). Imp is a 
character as well as one of the (at least two) narrators, or at the very least seems to be narrating 
her own actions. Already, in just the first three lines, the reader is unsure of the nature and 
identity of the narrator, yet Imp is quick to correct the loss of trust by introducing herself 
properly, “My name is India Morgan Phelps, though almost everyone I know calls me Imp” (1). 
It is only the first page and we already on a first name basis with the narrator/author/main 
character which would be fine except Imp immediately launches us into a level of intimacy we 
may not have been entirely prepared for. To paraphrase: Here is my name, this is where I’m 
from, and by the way, my mother died in a mental institution and my grandmother was crazy 
(Kiernan 1). An abrupt and unexpected level of intimacy and disclosure could be disarming for 
39 
 
some readers, but it also forms an immediate bond between narrator and reader. Nevertheless, we 
cannot dismiss the disclosure that Imp lies, or at the very least, omits information when talking to 
professionals. Because of this, we must ask, how can we trust that Imp is not hiding secrets from 
us as well? She entrusts us with hidden knowledge and therefore we must be special. We as 
readers, and in this moment, Imp’s friends, have a deeper connection with the narrator than she 
does with the therapist. Unfortunately, this false sense of security does not last for long. Imp 
shares her remorse for her inability to keep her family secrets from us, but she cannot tell us her 
story without breaking her family loyalty. However, breaking loyalties and telling secrets is a 
sign of a person who cannot be trusted, is it not? But we deem this as okay because she “could be 
writing fabricated versions of them, fictional avatars to stand in for the women they actually 
were.” (emphasis my own 5). This statement alone may create a doubt for us to seriously to 
consider.  
As we previously established in this paper, we know that Imp hears voices, and we are 
able to “hear” one of these voices in the form of the other “narrator.” But, if Imp rarely confesses 
to hearing sounds or voices, then how do we know the second narrator is not just a literary 
device, an experimental technique, or even just an inner conversation like we all have? How do 
we know these sounds or voices are not metaphorically speaking? For starters, we can notice the 
intrusiveness of the alternate “narrator,” with whom Imp has frequent discussions. One example 
being, “Imp stared a moment at what she had written, then added, ‘Stop stalling, India Morgan 
Phelps. It’s annoying” (Kiernan 21). Although this could be interpreted as Imp simply talking to 
herself like many of us do, but the intrusion of the “narrator” voice occurs again, randomly, in 
the middle of a paragraph, and narrates Imp taking a break, going to the bathroom, eating an 
apple, and continue typing (Kiernan 23). We learned from Schiller’s novel that occasionally the 
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voices were not all-over-powering; that sometimes, “they were more like chatterboxes in the 
back of my brain, talking to each other about me, narrating my every move” (20). The 
descriptive “narrator” is not her postponing the story line, but is a Voice, a symptom of 
schizophrenia, which we only know because of the psychological perspective. In addition, 
because we are aware of the intensity of the negativity of voices, we notice that the “narrator” 
slowly grows more and more critical, condemning, and even down-right malicious. We can 
easily compare the earlier gentle coxing to the later “‘Cut the crap and tell the story Imp…tell the 
story or don’t, but stop stalling. Stop Procrastinating. It’s annoying’ (Kiernan 98). Initially, like a 
friend, the “narrator” keeps the story on task. We begin to trust the “narrator” more than Imp 
herself. Lake a narcissistic abusive relationship, we do not catch the downgrading at first, 
because it happens little by little. Imp leads us away, we follow. When she goes off topic, we go 
off topic. The “narrator’s” chastising to her slowly becomes a critical voice in our own minds. 
We cannot control it, but that does not matter. We have to follow the story. No matter where it 
takes us… and the “narrator” yells at us for it. It is not until we identify the “narrator” as a voice 
rather than a writing device that we can see how abusive the “narrator” becomes. 
We are slightly comforted by Imp giving us a clear statement right from the beginning. 
She writes, “It seemed only fair to get the part about being crazy out up front, like a disclaimer, 
so if anyone ever reads this they’ll know to take it with a grain of salt” (6). This disclaimer lets 
us know not to take the novel too seriously and to not expect too much from the story line. In 
effect, even our expectations of a “normal” story are shattered by the disclosure of a mental 
disorder, but in the end, the story is safely embodied in a book. A negative side to this disclaimer 
is that it forces us to come to terms with our own stigmatizing beliefs that a person, much less a 
narrator, with a mental illness can or even should be trusted. Readers may reason, “Imp has a 
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mental disability, is her account trustworthy? Can we trust her perspective?” Even asking the 
question, “is this a reliable narrator?” shifts us into a battle of self-doubt. We have already 
discussed Imp hiding her symptomatic voices, but Imp will often slip in other areas too. Early in 
the novel she claims to have never had a migraine and then later states, “My usual cocktail of 
Excedrin and aspirin hasn’t helped. There is a railroad spike in my left eye, and there are 
gremlins running around in my skull banging on pots and pans. Skull goblins” (230). Initially 
claiming to not know what a headache feels like into having a “usual cocktail” to defeat frequent 
visitors (voices perhaps) “banging pots and pans” in her head tells readers that Imp often 
contradicts herself.  
Due to her own self-contradictions, we cannot be certain which symptoms Imp suffers 
from, but if we are familiar with the psychology of schizophrenia, we begin to see through her 
denial and the effort of silencing her symptoms. Because of the frequency of conflicting 
information within the story, we must ask ourselves, do we not trust the narrator because of the 
diagnosis, or is the obvious contradictions forcing us to not trust the narrator? And, if only for 
the sake of the contradictions, are those contradictions due to the illness? All of our narrative 
sources, including our own interpretations, are put into question. Our reluctance to trust 
ourselves or others as well as doubting the validity of formally perceived reliable sources is all 
part feeling the uncertainty of schizophrenia. Who can we trust when we cannot even trust 
ourselves? Our trust is thoroughly shaken, and paranoia is ready to take its place as we begin the 
novel. Welcome to the world of schizophrenia. 
 
A MOVE TOWARD LITERARY PSYCHOLOGY ANALYSIS  
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My paper has made the assertion that Psychology and Literature Studies have worked 
together in the past, yet now there is a need to blend the disciplines even more. This cross-
disciplinary approach has uncovered schizophrenia’s intersectionality and disruptive nature 
toward both heteronormative expectations and compulsory able-bodiedness. Despite their 
differences of time periods, disciplines, and genera, the cross analysis between these two texts 
have shown hesitations to disclose symptoms such as auditory hallucinations. Fear, stereotypes, 
and social control contribute to the ongoing stigmatization and othering of mental illness. But 
fortunately, authors who truly understand what it is like to live with disabling conditions are 
contributing to developing greater social awareness of unfair treatment and silencing of an 
underrepresented and oppressed population. Efforts by authors like Kiernan allow readers to 
experience what schizophrenia feels like by utilizing unique narrative techniques. Without a 
literary psychology analysis, the danger of average readers missing the richness of the experience 
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